Advisory Opinions in the Federal Judiciary -- A Comparative Study by Wagner, Wencelas J.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1958
Advisory Opinions in the Federal Judiciary -- A
Comparative Study
Wencelas J. Wagner
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Courts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wagner, Wencelas J., "Advisory Opinions in the Federal Judiciary -- A Comparative Study" (1958). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper
2343.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2343




There is a general agreement that the essential function of
the judiciary is to adjudicate disputes. In every legal system,
however, tribunals have some duties in non-contentious matters.
In the common-law countries, probate is a typical example. In
some legal systems the courts are empowered to determine what
the rights of the potential parties are prior to actual litigation,
upon a request by one of them or even a third party.
This "advisory opinion" procedure was accepted in the field
of international judicial proceedings. The "Statute" (Charter) of
the only permanent international tribunal, the International Court
of Justice, provides that "[t]he court may give an advisory opinion
on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be
authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations to make such a request."' Since the establishment of the
Court in 1920, the advisory opinion procedure was often resorted
to and resulted in "compulsory quasi-adjudication" of interna-
tional disputes.' In internal judicial systems, England may serve
as an instance of a country where the courts frequently delivered
opinions on legislative matters,' although the problem of uncon-
stitutional statutes does not exist in England.
In the United States, in Massachusetts and a few other
States, the courts do deliver advisory opinions.' But in the federal
tThis article is based on a forthcoming book, THE FEDERAL STATES AND
THEIR JUDICIARY-A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
AND ORGANIZATION OF COURTS IN FEDERAL STATES, Mouton & Co., Pub-
lishers, The Hague, Holland.
*Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Author, LEs LIBERTES DE
L'AIR (1948).
'Statute of International Court of Justice, Art. 65.2For details, see Wagner, Is a Compulsory Adjudication of International Legal Dis-
putes Possible?, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 21 (1952). For comments at the outset of the work
of the Court, see Hudson, Advisory Opinions of National and International Courts, 37
HARv. L. REv. 970 (1924).3Dubuque, The Duty of Judges as Constitutional Advisers, 24 AM. L. REV. 369,
380-383 (1890); Veeder, Advisory Opinions of the Judges of England, 13 HARV. L.
REV. 358 (1900). For discussion of references to the courts that they might solve dif-
ficulties in applying administrative law, see Wade, Consultation of the Judiciary by the
Executive, 46 L. Q. REv. 169, 177 (1930); for disadvantages of such a procedure, see
Allen, Administrative Consultation of the Judiciary, 47 L. Q. REV. 43 (1931).4For a list of advisory opinions delivered by the courts in Colorado, Massachusetts,
Maine, New Hampshire, and South Dakota from 1780 to 1937, see Field, The Advisory
Opinion--An Analysis, 24 IND. L. J. 203, 223-230 (1949).
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judicial system, it was early settled that they should abstain from
performing such duties. In 1793, Secretary of State Jefferson
sent a letter to Chief Justice Jay and the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court, telling them that war, going on in Europe,
produces transactions in American ports "on which questions
arise of considerable difficulty." Frequently, answers to these
questions "depend ... on the construction of our treaties, on the
laws of nature and nations, and on the laws of the land," and the
circumstances of the problems "do not give a cognizance of them
to the tribunals of the country." Jefferson intimated that Presi-
dent Washington would like to submit such questions to the Su-
preme Court, should it be willing to deliver its advice upon the
problems presented. It appeared that Washington had twenty-
nine questions to ask the Court, dealing with the rights and duties
of the United States, as a neutral country, with respect to the
belligerent parties.
Although, as it seems, it was generally believed that the
President had the right to ask the Justices for their opinion,5 the
Court declined to comply with the request, emphasizing the prin-
ciple of separation of powers which gives rise to "considerations
which afford strong arguments against the propriety of . . .
extra-judicially deciding the questions alluded to" by the Court.6
Therefore, for obtaining advisory opinions on legal matters,
the government turns to a member of the executive branch: the
Attorney General of the United States. As early as 1789, in its
first Judiciary Act, Congress established this office and imposed
upon the incumbent the duty "to give his advise and opin-
ion upon questions of law when required by the President of the
United States, or when requested by the heads of any of the de-
partments, touching any matters that may concern their depart-
ments."7 The opinions of the Attorney General are given great
weight and are usually followed in the decisions of the courts.'
Obviously, advisory opinions may be also requested from "legis-
lative" courts which were not established by virtue of Article III
of the Constitution. Upon their functions, this Article cannot
5
WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 109 (rev. ed.,
1947). In the Constitutional Convention, Pinckney proposed, on August 22, 1787, adop-
tion of the following provision: "Each branch of the Legislature, as well as the Supreme
Executive, shall have authority to require the opinions of the Supreme Judicial Court
upon important questions of law and upon solemn occasions." The proposal was based
on the Constitution of Massachusetts. It was referred to the Committee of Detail but
never reported on by it. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 505 (1937).
On July 21, Gorham of Massachusetts suggested allowing the Executive to obtain opin-
ions of the Supreme Court. ibid., n. 1 at 506.
6The correspondence between Jefferson and Jay is taken from Hart and Wechsler,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 75-77 (1953). Emphasis in original.
71 STAT. 93 (1789).
sHart and Wechsler, supra note 6, at 85.
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place any restrictions whatsoever. Thus, Section 1492 of the
Judicial Code provides that the Court of Claims "shall have juris-
diction to report to either House of Congress on any bill referred
to the court by such House, except a bill for a pension," and the
next section empowers the Court to deliver similar advisory
opinions on "any claim or matter involving controverted ques-
tions of law or fact," referred to it by any executive department.
"Constitutional" courts take jurisdiction only if a "case" or
"controversy" is presented to them. The Constitution uses both
terms. The second one "had long been associated in legal think-
ing" with the first one, and they cover "all disputes that might
come before federal courts for adjudication."9 The construction
of the constitutional terms was given a narrow interpretation by
the courts. In the frequently cited case of Muskrat v. United
States, ° the Supreme Court refused to examine the constitution-
ality of a congressional act before the rights which could be
claimed by the plaintiff were impaired. It stressed its determina-
tion to refrain from expressing its opinion on legal problems
where such an opinion would be delivered too early to grant
relief and definitely to settle the reciprocal rights and obligations
of the parties.
To have an actual controversy, the parties to the suit must
honestly claim rights adverse to each other. Feigned cases, friend-
ly suits, proceedings instituted collusively by the parties, will not
be examined by the courts." Similarly, the courts will decline to
take jurisdiction over "moot" cases, in which its decision would
not help plaintiff, as he received what he claimed before the ju-
dicial determination of his rights," served his term in a peniten-
tiary," or was refused the right to appear on a ballot in elections
which were already held.'
The courts decline to take jurisdiction over any question
which they consider to have a character of administrative pro-
ceedings; the Supreme Court said that "[i] t cannot give decisions
which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in
the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or ad-
9American Tire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 11 (1951). In a few opinions
the Supreme Court intimated that, if there is any difference between the two terms, it
lies in that possibly the term "controversies" does not include criminal cases. Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 419, 431-432 (1793); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346, 356-357 (1911). The list of cases in which the Court construed both terms was
given in Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 444 (1929).
10219 U.S. 346 (1911).
"See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943).
"California v. San Pablo & Tulara Railroad Co., 149 U.S. 308 (1893).
1St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943).
'
4 Shub v. Simpson, 340 U.S. 861 (1950).
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ministrative."" However, they can review administrative deci-
sions as to questions of law, recognizing findings of fact by ad-
ministrative agencies as conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence, unless such findings are arbitrary and capricious." Such
a review has all the characteristics of judicial proceedings.
For a long time, in the federal judicial system, no rights of
the parties could be adjudicated before they were violated. The
Supreme Court refused to take jurisdiction of cases in which there
was just a threat that some rights would be infringed, or where
some parties were uncertain as to their respective rights. 7 In a
few cases, the Supreme Court made statements indicating that its
powers should be considered as not extending to deliver declara-
tory judgments, 8 and refused to take cognizance of cases appealed
from state courts and decided on declaratory judgments statutes."
The result was that in order to have his rights settled, the interest-
ed party had to violate a criminal statute or a contested civil
obligation, and possibly become subject to either criminal prose-
cution or civil liability. Those unwilling to risk had to abstain
from asserting rights to which possibly they were entitled.
This attitude of the Court changed little by little,"° and in
1933, it entertained an appeal over a state court declaratory judg-
ment." Next year, Congress passed the Declaratory Judgments
Act. 2 As amended, it is incorporated into the Judicial Code of
1948, Section 2201 of which reads as follows:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction,
except with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the
United States... may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declara-
tion, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.
Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a
"5Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464, 469 (1930).
16See, e.g., Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U.S. 266 (1933).
"7However, in some classes of cases, the federal courts determined the rights of the
parties in absence of controversy. E.g., they established title to real estate based upon ad-
verse possession. Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U.S. 533 (1892). For other instances, see AN-
DERSON, ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 4 (1940); BORCHARD, DECLARA-
TORY JUDGMENTS 137 et seq. (2d ed., 1941).
18 See, e.g., Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928).
"9By 1934, declaratory judgments statutes were in force in 32 states; by 1941, in
37 states. BORCHARD, supra note 17, at p. VII of the Preface. By 1949, in only four
states there were no provisions for such a remedy. Note, Declaratory Judgments 1941-
1949, 62 HARV. L. REV. 787, 791 (1949).
2°It was observed that the attitude of the Court was caused by the fact it confused
declaratory judgments with advisory opinions. BORCHARD, supra note 17, at 71-80.
2"Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
22The bill had been introduced in Congress as early as 1919. Borchard, The Federal
Declaratory Judgments Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 35, 36 (1934).
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final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as
such.
The effect of the Act was that the parties were permitted
to have their rights declared before they were infringed, and no
enforcement of the decree was asked. A threat of invasion of
rights is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts. The
constitutionality of the Act was upheld by a unanimous Court in
Aetna Life Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn., v. Hawortb.23
Chief Justice Hughes pointed out, in his opinion, that the statu-
tory requirement of the existence of an actual controversy satis-
fies the constitutional conditions for accepting jurisdiction. The
effect of the Act was characterized as merely procedural. In
many instances, actions were brought to have questions deter-
mined which fell short of being actual "controversies," plaintiffs
invoking the Act. This was true particularly in requests addressed
to the courts to declare statutes to be unconstitutional. 4 The
courts guard themselves against taking jurisdiction in these in-
stances, and unduly extending the operation of the Act. 5 In
Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, the Court said,
citing many authorities:
The requirements for a justiciable case or controversy
are no less strict in a declaratory judgment proceed-
ing than in any other type of suit.... It has long been
its considered practice not to decide abstract, hypothe-
tical or contingent questions ......
Similarly to the United States, the High Court of Australia
does not deliver advisory opinions. The Australian Constitution
23300 U.S. 227 (1937).
241n Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, n. 40 at
572-573 (1946), the Court observed: "... . [T]he procedure [of declaratory judgments]
has been utilized to bring for decision challenges to an entire array of statutory pro-
visions alleged to violate rights secured by an almost equal array of constitutional pro-
visions. The strategic conception seems to have been that the declaratory judgment suit
furnishes a ready vehicle for presenting and securing decision of constitutional matters,
solely upon the pleadings, in highly abstract or premature, if not hypothetical states of
fact, and en masse."25E.g., in Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 443 (1938), the
Court said:
The District Court did not err in dismissing the cross bill. Defendants are not
entitled to invoke the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act in order to obtain an
advisory decree upon a hypothetical state of facts .... By the cross bill, defend-
ants seek a judgment that each and every provision of the Act is unconstitu-
tional. It presents a variety of hypothetical controversies which may never be-
come real. We are invited to enter into a speculative inquiry for the purpose
of condemning statutory provisions the effect of which in concrete situations,
not yet developed, cannot now be definitely perceived. We must decline that
invitation.
For a general discussion, see Trautman, Federal Right jurisdiction and the Declaratory
Remedy, 7 VAND. L. REv. 445 (1954).26Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945).
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does not speak about "cases" or "controversies," but about "mat-
ters." However, in the light of the constitutional interpretation
by the High Court, the difference lies only in the terms used, not
in the principle. As early as 1910, it could be asserted that in
order to entertain a suit challenging the constitutionality of an
act, there had to be an actual controversy between the parties, no
friendly or test cases being admissible. 7 However, this principle
was not finally settled until 1921. In 1910, the Judiciary Act was
amended by adding to it Part XII (Sec. 88-94) requiring from
the High Court to deliver advisory opinions. The new Section
88 of the Act conferred upon the High Court "jurisdiction to
hear and determine" questions "of law as to the validity of any
Act or enactment of the Parliament" which "the Governor-Gen-
eral refers to the High Court for hearing and determination";
references were to be determined by a Full Court (Sec. 89), the
decisions of which were to be final and conclusive (Sec. 93).
The validity of Part XII was challenged in In re Judiciary
and Navigation Acts.2" By the majority of five to one, the High
Court held the challenged provisions of the Act to be invalid.
The Court did not answer the question of whether the legislature
could require from it to deliver mere advisory opinions; but in
enacting Part XII, "Parliament desired to obtain from this Court
not merely an opinion but an authoritative declaration of the
law. To make such a declaration is clearly a judicial function, and
such a function is not competent to this Court unless its exercise
is an exercise of part of the judicial power of the Common-
wealth." 9 This judicial power extends to "matters" to be ad-
judicated by the Court. Rejecting the argument that "matter"
meant no more than legal proceeding,"0 and that Parliament might
at its discretion create or invent a legal proceeding in which the
High Court might be called on to interpret the Constitution by a
declaration at large, the Court held that the word "matter," as
used in Section 76 of the Australian Constitution, meant "the
subject matter for determination in a legal proceeding."" There
is no "matter," said the Court, "unless there is some immediate
right, duty or liability to be established by the determination of
27MOORE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 363(1910).
2829 COMMW. L.R. 257 (Austl. 1921).
29Ibid., at 264.
3°Such was the meaning given to the term "matter" by the Parliament, which de-
fined it, in Section 2 of the Judiciary Act, as including "any proceeding in a Court,
whether between parties or not, and also any incidental proceeding in a cause or matter."
"Cause," according to the Act, "includes any suit, and also . .. criminal proceedings."
"Suit" is an action or proceeding "between parties."
"11 re Judiciary and Navigation Acts, 29 CoMMW. L. R. 257, 265 (Austl. 1921).
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the Court."'" The Parliament "cannot authorize this Court to
make a declaration of the law divorced from any attempt to ad-
minister that law,"'" or "to determine abstract questions of law
without the right or duty of any body or person being involved."' 4
Part XII was left in Australian statute books for a few years, and
was repealed in 1934."
However, the High Court does not decline to deliver deci-
sions amounting to declaratory judgments. This power of the
Court is exercised primarily in proceedings to check the validity
of federal or state statutes after they have been enacted. 6 Thus,
in Attorney-General for Victoria v. Commonwealth," it was
held that the Attorney-General of a state has a sufficient title to
invoke the provisions of the Constitution for the purpose of chal-
lenging the validity of Commonwealth legislation which extends
to, and operates within, the state whose interests he represents. 8
Declaratory judgments may become an important means to de-
limit the power of public authorities, particularly when the prob-
lem of the borderline between public and private enterprise is
involved."
Likewise, Argentina followed the United States pattern. One
of the early statutes of the united country ° stated expressly the
rule that the courts will act only in cases of actual controversies. 1
And in In re Francioni," the Supreme Court said that there may
be a judicial suit only if there are adversary parties and justiciable
questions presented, and so the Court will be able to render a
judgment which will be judicially enforced.4' As early as 1885,
32Ibid., at 265. On the basis of the above and some other decisions of the High
Court, Wynes gives the following definition of "matter" in Australian law: "A
.matter' may be defined as the subject of a dispute between parties as to the existence of
some legal right, duty, obligation or liability which is asserted to exist on the one hand
and denied on the other; the question must directly affect the parties in some definite
manner." Wynes, The Judicial Power of the Commonwealth, 11 AuSTL. L. J. 546, 547
(1937).
3"In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts, 29 COMMW. L. R. 257, 266 (Austl. 1921).
'4Ibid., at 267. Higgins, J., dissenting, said that it was "not necessary that a 'matter'
should be between parties." Ibid., at 272.
"5The statement that recently the High Court has broadened its concept on this
question does not seem to be supported by decisions. Riesenfeld and Hazard, Federal
Courts in Foreign Systems, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 29, n. 15 at 32 (1948), citing
Rex v. The Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, 19 AUSTL. L. J. 169
(1945).
36Freund, The Federal Judiciary, in STUDIES IN FEDERALISM 106, 108 (Bowie and
Friedrich, eds. 1954).
3771 COMMW. L. R. 237 (Austl. 1945).
3Ibid., at 247-248, by Latham, C. J., citing some previous cases.
39FRIEDMANN, PRINCIPLES OF AUSTRALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 72 (1950). See
pp. 73-74 for other instances in which declaratory judgments are available in Australia.4 0Law No. 17 (1862).4 1AMADEO, ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 62 (1943).
42110 S. C. N. 391 (1907).
4 3 AMADEO, supra note 41, at 70.
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the Supreme Court refused, in Pintos v. Sosa," to render any
opinions on legal matters either to the executive or the legislative
branch of government.' And next year, in Ex Parte Moores,"
the Court dismissed a petition to declare an act of Congress null
and void where there was no defendant, and no rights of anyone
have yet been violated. Said the Court:
The federal courts cannot make general declara-
tions, but must apply legal principles to a specific and
concrete controversy. The court that should declare a
law unconstitutional without reference to a specific
controversy would be acting outside of its sphere of ac-
tion and would invade that of the legislative power."
On the whole, the Court established a notion of "case and
controversy" very similar to that in the United States which is
quite understandable in view of the strong influence of the older
North American federal system over that of Argentina.
In the Swiss system there is nothing in the Constitution or
federal statutes which would empower the Federal Tribunal to
deliver advisory opinions. The general rule is that the Tribunal
will not take cognizance of any question submitted to it unless
there is an actual controversy between the parties. This rule is
applicable not only with respect to cases between individuals, but
also in relation to -[c]onflicts of competence between federal
authorities of the one part, and cantonal authorities of the other
part" (Art. 113 (1) of the Swiss Constitution), so that the de-
cision of the Tribunal may settle a real litigation instead of being
a mere expression of opinion.
However, the existence of a real controversy is found in a
somehow broader scope of situations than in the United States. A
case of 1939 between the Swiss Confederation and the Canton
Basel-Town is a good illustration. By two popular initiatives in
the Canton, an enactment of laws was promoted. Their purpose
was to prohibit the activity of Nazi and Fascist organizations.
The federal authorities requested those of the Canton to stop any
proceedings in the matter of those initiatives, on the ground that
they encroached upon the scope of powers of the Confederation.
The Canton refused to comply with the request, whereupon a
suit was instituted against it. This is what the Tribunal had to
4428 S. C. N. 411 (1885).4 5AMADEO, supra note 41, at 83.
4630 S. C. N. 281 (1886).4 7AMADEO, supra note 41, at 82-83.
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say about the character of the situation and its own competence
to deliver a decision:
The present conflict of competencies, raised by the Fed-
eral Council, involves the question of whether the Can-
ton Basel-Town has jurisdiction to enact some statutory
provisions. However, these provisions were not yet
enacted. . . . It seems that the Great Council [of the
Canton] is faced with formally valid initiatives. The
Federal Council challenges the cantonal authority to
enact the provisions in question. Empowered by the
Great Council, the Governmental Council [of the Can-
ton] claims this authority for the Canton. Therefore,
there is a controversy in a concrete question of jurisdic-
tion between a federal authority and a cantonal au-
thority. . . . The decision of the Federal Tribunal has
here not the effect of an expression of opinion in a mere
virtually abstract position taken on their competences;
it compels the Great Council, under these circum-
stances, to take a certain stand as to the handling of the
[popular] initiatives.48
The Tribunal proceeded to discuss the merits of the com-
plaint, reached the conclusion that the enactment of the statutes
under consideration would be ultra vires of the Canton, and en-
joined the authorities of the Canton from taking any further ac-
tion on either of the two initiatives. Obviously, in the United
States the complaint would be dismissed as premature.
Thus, the general rule is made flexible in some situations,
and particularly when the validity of an act of cantonal authori-
ties is challenged. By virtue of the Swiss Judiciary Act of 1943, 4 9
the plaintiff's rights must have been impaired by the act before
he can bring an action; but he must not wait until he is required
to comply with the act. On the contrary, the interested person
is to act promptly after the act should have been known to him."0
According to the decisions of the Federal Tribunal, in cases of
legislative acts, this period does not run from the time of publi-
cation, but from the date when it became generally known.51 In
the light of the statutory provisions and their construction by the
4865 BGE 1 106, 114-115 (1939).
4995 BUNDESBLATr 1, 167 (1943); 60 RECUEIL DES Lois FEDERALES 269 (1944)
Sec. 88: "Individuals or collective bodies injuriously affected by decisions or acts that
concern them personally or have general application have standing to institute the action."50Article 89 of the Judiciary Act: "The complaint must be filed with the Federal
Tribunal within thirty days after the announcement of the challenged act or decision, in
accordance with cantonal law."
5166 BGE I 70 (1940), GER. 66 I 70 cited by Fleiner and Giacometti, SCHWEI-
ZERISCHES BUNDESSTAATRECHT, note 68 at 896 (1949).
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Tribunal, it seems that every person affected in any way by the
cantonal act is free to challenge the validity of the act in a stage
where he would have no standing to sue in the United States.52
Said the Tribunal:
Whoever is affected, as to his personal legal rights,
by the allegedly unconstitutional provisions . . . has
standing to challenge such a statute of general applica-
tion. It depends on whether the complainants actually
fall within the rules enacted by the government; an ac-
tual legal interest in the declaration of invalidity is not
required.53
Considering the liberality of the construction of justiciable
controversy in Switzerland, it is not surprising that the Federal
Tribunal developed the practice of delivering declaratory judg-
ments even without being authorized by the Constitution to do
so. In a few of the cantons, such judgments are authorized by
legislative enactments; in some others, they are delivered by the
courts even without any statutory basis.54
In Brazil, the principle that the judiciary cannot express its
opinion on questions if there is no "justiciable" controversy be-
tween two or more parties is inapplicable, by virtue of Article 8
of the Constitution of Brazil, in cases involving federal interven-
tion in the affairs of the states.
Article 8 requires the federal legislature to decree interven-
tion in eight instances; in seven of them,5 its action must be pre-
ceded by a declaration by the Federal Supreme Court that the
act of the state authorities was unconstitutional. The Court is to
5 2For a discussion of these rules, see Fleiner and Giacometti, supra note 51, at 893
and 896. The authors favor a procedure which would establish the invalidity of legis-
lative acts before they become effective. In essence, it would be the advisory opinion
device.
5365 BGE I 236, 241 (1939).5 4BORCHARD, supra note 17, at 118-120.5 5These instances arise when the following principles are violated:
a) Representative republican form;
b) Independence and harmony of powers;
c) Temporality of the elective functions, the duration of these latter being limited
to that of the corresponding federal functions;
d) Prohibition of re-election of governors and mayors for the period immediately
following;
e) Municipal autonomy;
f) Rendering of administrative accounts;
g) Guaranties of judicial power.
It is hardly necessary to emphasize that some of these points are either vague or sweep-
ing. Also, by virtue of Article 9, the President of the Union has the power to decree inter-
vention in five instances. He is to act upon a requisition of the Federal Supreme Court
if an obstruction is exercised against the judicial power and if execution of judicial orders
or decisions is to be insured.
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examine the problem when it is "submitted by the Attorney Gen-
eral of the Republic."
The Canadian system is completely different from that in
other federal states. In Canada, the duties of the courts are not
at all limited to deciding "cases and controversies." True, there
is nothing about advisory opinions in the Canadian Constitution;
but they were provided for by legislation.56 Provisions about
"references" (advisory opinions) are found in Sections 55 and 56
of the Supreme Court Act of 1927"7 and repeat the rule embodied
in Section 60 of the former Supreme Court Act.58 The Court is
to serve as legal adviser of the two other branches of government,
executive or legislative (Governor, Senate, or House of Com-
mons). Section 55 (1) empowers the Governor in Council to
refer "to the Supreme Court for hearing and consideration" any
"[i]mportant questions of law or fact touching (a) the inter-
pretation of the British North America Acts; (b) the constitu-
tionality or interpretation of any Dominion or provincial legisla-
tion; . . . (d) the powers of the Parliament of Canada, or of the
legislatures of the provinces, or of the respective governments
thereof... or (e) any other matter ......
The last clause is sweeping, and it covers all the other ones.
It follows that the Court has to answer any question submitted to
it even if there is no actual litigation on the point involved, the
only limitation being that the problem be "important." However,
most significant advisory opinions were delivered by the Court
in situations where the constitutionality of some legislative acts
was doubtful. Many essential constitutional problems were settled
by the Court by the way of "references," and particularly the
question of the scope of power of the Dominion and provincial
legislatures. Section 5 5 (2) of the Supreme Court Act expressly
requires the Court, upon receiving a request for an advisory opin-
ion from the Governor in Council, "to answer each question so
referred;" and the opinion of the Court "shall be pronounced in
like manner as in the case of a judgment upon an appeal to the
Court."6
56 The first provisions to that effect were enacted as early as 1875; they found
their place in acts of 1891 and 1906.
57CAN. REV. STAT., c. 35 (1927); c. 259 (1952).5 8CAN. REV. STAT., C. 139 (1906).59Chief Justice of Ontario Rowell, The Place and Functions of the Judiciary in our
Canadian Constitution, 15 CAN. B. REv. 57 (1937).601t is the duty of the Court to answer each question submitted. It cannot refuse
by saying it is not important enough. Section 55 (1) (e) of the Supreme Court Act
expressly states that the Governor in Council himself is to decide whether the require-
ment of the importance of the question is met, the questions referred by him being
"conclusively deemed" to be important.
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Section 56 of the Act requires the Court to deliver advisory
opinions also upon request of the Senate or House of Commons.
In Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for
Canada,61 it was contended that the Governor-General in Council
had no power to refer to the Supreme Court questions which af-
fect the interests of the provinces without obtaining their consent
to such reference, and that the provision of the Supreme Court
Act, if understood as authorizing such references, was ultra vires
of the Dominion Parliament and void, as converting the Court
into a "branch of the Executive Government, an advisory com-
mittee for the purpose of advising the Executive upon any ques-
tion which the Governor-General sees fit to refer to it." 6' The
Supreme Court Act was attacked not only on the ground that it
invaded the provincial rights, but also that it violated the Consti-
tution by requiring the judiciary to perform non-judicial duties.
However, the Privy Council affirmed the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada and held that although there was nothing in the
Constitution expressly authorizing the Executive to ask the Court
for its opinion, there was neither anything prohibiting it. Re-
ferring to the British practice where the House of Lords "possess-
es in its legislative capacity a right to ask the judges what the law
is, in order to better inform itself how if at all the law should be
altered,"6 the Council held the challenged provision valid. It
pointed out that by delivering advisory opinions, the Court does
not cease to be a judicial body.
These opinions are usually called "judgments," and may be
delivered, upon request of the Governor-General, not only as to
federal, but also as to provincial legislation. 4
The provinces followed the example of the Dominion and
enacted statutes providing for advisory opinions. Typical are the
provisions of the Ontario Constitutional Questions Act "6 and the
Judicature Act, 6 which regulate the question of "references"
along the lines established by the Dominion. Section 6 of the
first of these acts states that the opinion delivered by the court
"shall be deemed a judgment of the court, and an appeal shall lie
therefrom as from a judgment in an action."
Advisory opinions are delivered after hearing all interested
parties, and practically they may be assimilated to declaratory
6:[1912] A. C. 571.
62Ibid., at 575.
63lbid., at 586.
64See, e.g., Reference in the Matter of Three Bills Passed by the Legislative Assem-
bly of the Province of Alberta, [1938] S.C.R. 100.6 5R~v. STAT. ONT., c. 65 (1950).6 6 Rmf. STAT. ONT., c. 190 (1950).
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judgments. 7 In theory, however, it was often stressed that they
do not have the effect of a judgment. The Privy Council em-
phasized the fact that "the answers are only advisory and will
have no more effect that the opinions of the law officers";"6 and
the Canadian Supreme Court added that "[i]t has invariably
been declared that they are not judgments either binding on the
Government, on Parliament, on individuals, and even on the
Court itself, although, of course, this should be qualified by say-
ing that, in a contested case where the same questions would arise,
they would no doubt be followed.""9
By now, the advisory opinions procedure is deeply imbedded,
in Canada, and is an integral part of its legal system.
Whether the function of the courts, in federal as in other
states, should be strictly limited to "cases and controversies," is a
question which was and is being disputed. Unquestionably, the
declaratory judgments device is included in the concept of "con-
troversies," and there seems to be no good reason whatsoever for
not exercising jurisdiction in cases where such a relief is asked. It
it more difficult to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of
advisory opinions. Some points raised by the critics do not dis-
credit this function of the courts in any way. Such is, for
example, the statement that advisory opinions infringe upon the
principle of separation of powers. But there was never any
perfect separation of powers in any country, and besides, this
principle is not a goal in itself, but only a means to achieve a satis-
factory system of government. Again, it was pointed out that
the advisory opinion function is closer to judicial than legislative
duties.7"
The contention that the purely judicial duties of the courts
take so much of their time, and their dockets are so crowded, that
they should not be additionally burdened with advisory opinions,
seems without merit. First, overburdening of the courts is
hardly a reason for limiting the scope of their duties, and
should the advisory opinions device be found advantageous and
proper as a task of the judiciary, trivial and technical considera-
tions should not be decisive for rejecting the idea. Besides, the
creation of additional justiceships can always improve the situa-
tion. Second, the practice in Canada and other jurisdictions, such
as some States in the United States,7' shows that advisory opinions
67
MOORE, supra note 27, at 367.6 8Atty. Gen. for Ontario v. Atty. Gen. for Canada, [1912] A. C. 571, 589.
69Reference Re Validity of the Wartime Leasehold Regulations, 2 D. L. R. 1, 3
(1950).
70Clovis and Updegraff, Advisory Opinions, 13 IOwA L. REv. 188, 196 (1928).
71See the list of advisory opinions in the states, supra note 4.
ADVISORY OPINIONS
are rarely and cautiously requested. The device is never open to
the general public, as are the courts in cases of actual controver-
sies. It is available only to the legislative or executive branch of
government at the top level, or to both of them. In some juris-
dictions, it can be resorted to only with respect to questions aris-
ing from pending legislation. 2 Third, a request for an opinion on
the constitutionality of an act, if not presented to the justices
before the measure is taken, is almost certain to be directed to the
court by interested parties after their rights are affected, and to
take some time of the court in any event.
Some other arguments against advisory opinions are better
founded. It was observed that there are less dissents in advisory
opinions than in regular judicial opinions because of lack of strong
argumentation of the parties directly affected by the result of
the proceedings, in briefs of their counsel and oral discussions.7
Therefore, the judges are deprived of the opportunity to analyze
the situation as deeply and thoroughly as they can do in conten-
tious proceedings. Many of such shortcomings of the advisory
opinions device do not lie in their nature, the situation could be
improved by arranging representation of interested groups in the
court during the consideration of the problem involved." It seems
that in Canada much effort is made to give all those interested
the opportunity to present their point of view, and to give the
court the opportunity to examine the question in all its aspects,
after hearing arguments of the counsel. Even so, it seems hardly
possible to give the court the advantage of an actual "justiciable"
controversy. 5 There remains the difficulty that it is sometimes
impossible to foresee all the effects and instances of application of
a statute, and that the court is bound by the very terms of the
reference which may be broad or narrow."
72 E.g., in In re Senate Resolution Relating to Senate Bill No. 65, 12 Colo. 466
(1889), the Colorado Supreme Court said that advisory opinions must be limited, for
obvious reasons, to questions of law; that they must be exclusively publici juris, and
connected with pending legislation.7 3Field, supra note 4, at 216.
741bid., at 220.
75"However much provision may be made on paper for adequate arguments (and
experience justifies little reliance) advisory opinions are bound to move in an unreal
atmosphere. The impact of actuality and the intensities of immediacy are wanting. In
the attitude of court and counsel, in the vigor of adequate representation of the facts
behind legislation. . . there is thus a wide gulf of difference, partly rooted in psycho-
logic factors, between opinions in advance of legislation and decisions in litigation after
such proposals are embodied into law." Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37
HARV. L. REv. 1002, 1006 (1924).76LaBrie, Canadian Constitutional Interpretation and Legislative Review, 8 U.
TORONTO L. J. 298, 347-348 (1950).
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That advisory opinions have no authority of res judicata, ex-
cept in a few jurisdictions," is perhaps their strength rather than
weakness. In some jurisdictions (including Canada), requests to
deliver advisory opinions are directed to the supreme courts; in
others, to the justices of the courts. (The latter is the situation in
most of the States of the United States.) 78 Undoubtedly, in most
jurisdictions, the most important function of advisory opinions
is to help the legislative or executive branch of government to
decide whether an intended act is constitutional or not. Obvious-
ly, the opinion of the justices is entitled to utmost weight,"9 and
in most instances, a measure disapproved by them will not be
taken or will be changed to avoid provisions subject to attack.
Should the advice of the justices be disregarded, the branch of
government involved is warned about the fate which its act
should be expected to meet. And usually, it is declared invalid. It
was observed that this is due to the fact that the justices, having
considered the question at the stage of delivering an advisory
opinion, are biased and unwilling to change the position they have
taken.8" But it is only natural that a person has a settled opinion
on matters that he is asked to consider; and, should the judges see
the problem in another light and change their mind after recon-
sidering the question arising this time not only from theoretical
speculations, but from a concrete factual situation, the court is
free to deliver a judgment contrary to the former advisory opin-
ion. Although rarely,8 ' such instances do happen, and it does not
seem that they should serve as an argument condemning the whole
idea, as was done by some outstanding jurists. 2 It must be re-
membered that even judgments having the full effect of res judi-
cata may be overruled. The judicial opinion on the validity of an
act in its preparatory stage has undeniable advantages. It does not
eliminate the possibility of judicial review; but judicial review is
resorted to in a fewer number of situations. Granting all the ad-
vantages of judicial review, it is clear that the less often acts are
77Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court, considering the constitutional amendment
adopted in 1886 (Art. 6, Sec. 3), reading that "the supreme court shall give its opinion
upon important questions upon solemn occasions, when required by the governor, the
senate, or the house of representatives; and all such opinions shall be published in con-
nection with the reported decisions of the court," reached the conclusion that responses
to such questions have all the force and effect of judicial precedents. In re Senate Resolu-
tion Relating to Senate Bill No. 65, 12 Colo. 466 (1889). The Supreme Court of
Maine took a similar view of the effect of advisory opinions. However, "the weight of
precedent, as well as the better reason and wisdom, is in favor of holding such opinions
merely advisory." WILLOUGHBY, I THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 18 (2d ed., 1929).
7SField, supra note 4, at 213-214; Clovis and Updegraff, supra note 70, at 192.79Hudson, supra note 2, at 983.
"
0For discussion, see Clovis and Updegraff, supra note 70, at 195.
"'Field, supra note 4, at 221.2See, e.g., Frankfurter, sura note 75, at 1006-1007.
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held unconstitutional and invalidated by the courts, the better.
The ideal of certainty of law would be best served if there were
no "bad" acts whatsoever. Innumerable complications may arise
after a statute, treated for some time as good law, is declared un-
constitutional. Although in theory, such a statute is said to be
considered as if it never were enacted, in many instances its appli-
cation results in creating situations which are impossible to re-
verse.83 For millions of people it is vital to know as soon as possi-
ble whether a statute is constitutional or not; for a final determi-
nation of this question in the Supreme Court, in a regular judicial
procedure, months or years are necessary. It is an unfortunate sit-
uation when time is of utmost essence. 4 In many instances, the
problem is too pressing and too important to depend on the bring-
ing of a suit by an individual affected by the act, with the result
that great constitutional questions may be answered in cases hav-
ing the character of being accidental;5 the branch of government
whose measure is under attack is unable to defend the general ef-
fect of its action, and the decision of the court may be the result
of pre-determination."6
In federal states, advisory opinions might have a particularly
advantageous function to fulfill in preventing the enactment of
federal legislation which could infringe upon state rights, or state
legislation undermining the federal scope of power. Such situa-
tions are likely to engender state-federal tension to a greater or
lesser degree. The experience of Canada is rather encouraging.
To some the advisory opinion is an "apparently ... excellent pre-
ventive instrument," and "it is to be hoped that progress will not
stop with the establishment of that noteworthy improvement in
governmental machinery" which is the declaratory judgment, but
will extend to acceptance of advisory opinions." To others, how-
ever, such opinions "are ghosts that slay.""8 And, in spite of the
few weaknesses and many advantages of the device, there seems
to be no indication of a trend to accept advisory opinions in fed-
eral countries which do not yet recognize this procedure. Many
jurists in the United States, even though they do not advocate the
adoption of advisory opinions, feel that an intermediate device
83 1t did happen that before the question reached the Supreme Court, federal acts
were held good by some District Courts, and were enforced in some States, while they
were invalidated by others. Doubt, confusion, and economic cost followed. JACKSON,
THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 303-304 (1941).84Aumann, The Supreme Court and the Advisory Opinion, 4 OHIO ST. L. J. 21,
25 (1937); JACKSON, supra note 83, at 303-304; and JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 24-25 (1955).8 5MOORE, supra note 27, at 365.86JACKSON, supra note 83, at 365.87Clovis and Updegraff, supra note 70, at 198.
SSFrankfurter, supra note 75, at 1008.
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between them and the present system of judicial review should be
figured out. The requirement of a "case," as understood today,
has too many defects to be considered satisfactory;" and as ap-
plied to instances involving constitutional questions, it gives only
a few advantages." Therefore, "a more expeditious, orderly, and
centralized procedure" is needed, 1 such as would "give to judicial
review more extensive advisory and preventive possibilities," and
if necessary, should be accomplished by constitutional change.92
The possibility of abusing the device for delay" does not have
much to do with the advantage of advisory opinions. Most rights
can be abused.
89FELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE 306-312 (1935).
9°1bid., at 323.
91JACKSON, supra note 83, at 309.9 2FIELD, supra note 89, at 325.
9 3DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 47 (1956).
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